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Abstract: We explore how the uniformity of electoral swings in the district vote within 
countries is affected by the level of economic and political decentralization. We rely 
on district-level data from OECD countries in two consecutive elections before and 
after the Great Recession to show that as regional governments exert more influence 
over the central government, districts deviate less from the overall pattern of change in 
support of the national incumbent party. The causal mechanism accounting for the 
effect of decentralization on dynamic nationalization is examined with individual panel 
data from national elections in Canada and Spain. 
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Swing districts or regions are decisive in mass elections. Given that parties and 
candidates have limited resources, they make deliberate and careful choices about where 
to invest their mobilization efforts and allocate their targetable goods. The logic of 
targeting a swing district or region is particularly compelling because doing so can make 
the difference between winning and losing seats (Cox, 2009; Golder et al., 2017: chapter 
4). There is overwhelming evidence across a wide variety of countries and institutional 
settings that the allocation of grants (i.e., transfers) from central to sub-national 
governments is targeted to swing districts (see, for instance, the empirical evidence from 
third-wave democracies such as Albania (Case, 2001), India (Arulampalam et al., 2009), 
Russia (Marques et al., 2016), Senegal (Caldeira, 2012) or Spain (Castells and Solé-Ollé, 
2005). Not surprisingly, voters in swing districts themselves anticipate that they will 
benefit from the subsequent allocation of public goods ("Trump Voters in a Swing District 
Wonder When the ‘Winning’ Will Start", New York Times, April 17, 2017).1 
 
The existence and number of swing districts or regions depends to a great extent 
on whether there is 'similar response by all subunits to political forces in a given year' 
(Claggett et al., 1984: 81-82). The incentives for an unequal geographic mobilization or 
allocation of targetable goods increase when districts or regions do not respond with a 
uniform surge toward (or away from) a particular party. The concept of dynamic 
nationalization captures the degree of homogeneity in change of party support in each 
district across two or more elections. If party support moves in the same way in all 
districts, then support is dynamically nationalized. But if the party moves up in some 
districts while failing (or moving up at different rates) in others, then candidates or local 
issues must drive electoral decisions (Morgenstern et al., 2014: 187). In sum, the more 
(less) nationalized in dynamic terms a country or a party system is, the more (less) 
territorially homogeneous the incentives for campaigning and allocating targetable goods. 
   
How institutional and societal variables affect dynamic nationalization remains 
largely unexplored. As the story about swing districts or regions mainly depends on how 
important local events and issues are at the expense of national policy, it is especially 
                                                          
1 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/17/us/politics/trump-voters-swing-state.html 
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surprising that the influence of the decentralization of political and economic power on 
the consistency of change in parties' fortunes across the nation has been virtually 
neglected.  
 
In this paper we fill this gap and explore how dynamic nationalization is 
influenced by the scope of the authority of regional governments. In order to develop a 
generalizable causal model, we examine three approaches to the study of subnational 
variation in electoral swing. The first approach relates dynamic nationalization to the 
incentives provided by political institutions under which parties and voters make 
decisions. The second is sociological and links subnational variation in electoral swings 
to the varying social composition of district electorates. Finally, the third is aggregate 
economic voting, which presumes that economic performance affects electoral swings 
across districts. We argue that as regional governments exert more influence over the 
central government, districts or regions will deviate less from the overall pattern of 
change in support for the national incumbent party between elections. Those individuals 
who blame the regional government for a poor economic performance have a lower 
probability to switch their vote in national elections than those who blame the national 
government. As this logic applies to all districts within a decentralized country, 
decentralization reduces the number of swing voters everywhere and leads to a higher 
dynamic nationalization. 
 
Our aggregate empirical evidence comes from a sample of 3,796 districts in 31 
OECD countries in two consecutive lower-house elections before and after 2008, when 
the Great Recession started. Given national forces are particularly strong during the 
economic crisis, we test our argument when the effect of decentralization on dynamic 
nationalization is expected to be weaker and then our results will me more robust. We 
also rely on individual panel data from national elections in two highly decentralized 
countries, Canada and Spain, to examine the causal mechanism through which 
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ARGUMENTS 
Interest in the extent to which swings from one election to the next are similar 
across districts and regions in a country goes back at least to Schaatschneider (1960) 
almost sixty years ago −the 'universality of political trends' (1960: 93) in his own words. 
Unfortunately, with very few exceptions (Alemán and Kellam, 2017, Morgenstern et al., 
2009), existing research is overwhelmingly focused on single countries and the 
measurement and description of changes in dynamic nationalization over time (see 
Morgenstern et al., 2014). How country-level institutional and societal variables affect 
dynamic nationalization has been barely explored. This clearly contrasts with thriving 
research on static nationalization (Caramani and Kollman, 2017). 
 
As dynamic nationalization has a significant influence on regional politics and 
development and depends on the relevance of local issues, in this paper we explore the 
extent to which it is affected by the degree of decentralization of political and economic 
power. Decentralization of power has been a worldwide trend in recent decades, 
sometimes referred to as the “era of regionalization” (Hooghe et al., 2010: 52). This 
worldwide trend has reached the point of no return according to the World Bank: 
“strategies to stop decentralization are unlikely to succeed, as the pressures to decentralise 
are beyond government control” (World Bank, 2000: 124).  
 
When explaining what determines dynamic nationalization, we distinguish three 
approaches: one that emphasizes the role of institutions, another that is focused on the 
importance of social cleavages, and a third one relying on aggregate economic voting. 
The crucial question addressed by the three approaches is whether subnational variation 
in electoral swings systematically differs across countries.  
 
- Institutional explanation 
Three types of institutional explanation have been suggested to explain 
subnational variation in change in support for the national incumbent party. They are 
focused on the executive system, the electoral system and the degree and type of 
decentralization of power.  
 
Political regimes: Parliamentary regimes are expected to be more nationalized 
than presidential regimes. As party labels tend to be stronger in the former than in the 
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latter, voters will be more likely to respond to national party appeals than to local or 
candidate-specific appeals (Mogernstern et al., 2009: 1327).  
 
Electoral systems: Electoral systems are also expected to have a significant impact 
on dynamic nationalization. In particular, countries using Proportional Representation 
(PR) should be more nationalized than those using majoritarian systems for three reasons: 
(i) the incentives to cultivate a personal vote or, in other words, localism is greater in 
systems that employ single-member districts than in PR systems (Carey and Shugart, 
1995); (ii) the higher the number of districts, the more challenging the linkage across 
districts is and more variable the elections results are (Harbers, 2010); (iii) Morgenstern 
et al. (2009: 1327-1328) argue that the electoral system does not make a difference for 
dynamic nationalization. However, the expectations we derive from their arguments (the 
greater the differentiation among districts when an electoral system is carved into more 
and smaller pieces the more difficult the coordination of campaign strategies, and the 
greater the variability in terms of candidate qualities when the number of districts 
increases) lead us to hypothesize that dynamic nationalization should be greater in 
countries using multi-member districts than in those using single member districts. 
 
Decentralization of power: Morgenstern et al. (2009: 1328) argue that federalism 
should generate variable responsiveness to national forces in the districts (i.e., lower 
dynamic nationalization) because local politicians are willing and able to react to local 
events and issues. In unitary countries, however, national decision makers can more easily 
mandate local political strategy, thus reducing local variation in response. The impact of 
federalism on dynamic nationalization should be magnified when there is a heterogeneous 
population. Nevertheless, using a dummy variable identifying federal countries in a 
sample of 60 parties in 28 countries, Morgenstern et al. found that federalism has little 
impact by itself. When they restrict the sample to parliamentary regimes (most of the 
countries in the sample), the federalism variable has a positive and marginally significant 
effect on dynamic nationalization, which is the opposite of their theoretical expectation.  
 
In contrast with this argument, we claim that decentralization reduces subnational 
variation in electoral swings (i.e., it increases dynamic nationalization). In order to make 
governments accountable for actions and outcomes, voters must assign responsibility. 
The conventional wisdom establishes that negative economic evaluations only hurt the 
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incumbent when voters blame the government for worsening economic conditions 
(Powell and Whitten, 1993; Golder et al., 2017: chapter 7). Our point is that in highly 
decentralized countries the proportion of voters who think that the regional government 
has more influence on their well-being than the national government should be greater 
than in weakly decentralized countries.  
 
In the context of the Great recession, this means that supporters of the national 
incumbent party in the previous election who primarily blame the regional incumbent for 
worsening economic conditions will be more reluctant to switch their vote to support an 
opposition party in the upcoming national election than those who blame the national 
incumbent. As this decision-making process applies to individuals in all districts in 
decentralized countries, we hypothesize that the more decentralized a country is, the 
lower the number of swing voters in national elections. Because the national swing is 
lower in decentralized countries it follows, more or less mechanically, that regional or 
district variations around the national swing will also be lower. 2 Accordingly, we predict, 
contra conventional wisdom, that at least in the context of a recession, decentralization 
leads to an increase in the uniformity of electoral swings across districts, simply because 
the electoral swing is smaller, as fewer supporters of the incumbent party are prone to 
punish it for poor economic performance.  
 
Given that the mechanism explaining the impact of decentralization on the size of 
electoral swings is whether responsibility is shared between the national and regional 
incumbents, the effect of decentralization on dynamic nationalization should be driven by 
granting regions more influence over the central government –shared-rule− and not by 
self-rule –the authority exercised by a region over citizens in its territory− (Elazar, 1987). 
This argument is in line with the conventional wisdom about how decentralization ought 
to inspire the creation and growth of regional parties. As explained and shown by Lublin 
(2012, 2014), greater self-rule may well increase incentives toward regional party 
formation in regional elections as autonomy makes control of regional governments more 
attractive, but it may not have the same impact in statewide contests. Voters who might 
support a regional party that could win power or at least become a significant political 
force in regional contests may be more reluctant to cast a ballot for the same party at the 
                                                          
2 For the same reason that, everything else being equal, the lower the mean the lower the standard deviation 
around the mean. 
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national level if it is only a minor player. On the contrary, shared rule increases the value 
of regional government control through regional influence on the central government but 
also accentuates the importance of power in the center. A similar point is made by 
Brancati (2008, 2009) when she argues that decentralization encourages regional party 
growth as it provides opportunities to accrue power and resources at the regional level. 
These incentives are especially powerful when regional legislatures select some or all 
member of the national upper house, promoting the chance to gain influence at the 
national as well as regional level. 
 
- Sociological explanation 
Morgenstern et al. (2009: 1328), hypothesize that ethnolinguistic fragmentation 
should reduce dynamic nationalization. When ethnic groups are geographically 
concentrated, the distinctiveness of local electoral units increases and this creates 
discontinuities in the response of regions to national electoral forces. According to 
Aguilar and Sánchez-Cuenca (2008), supporters of ethnoregional parties take into 
account not only government performance when casting their votes but also whether the 
government is representing their group. As a result, voters will behave differently across 
districts and electoral swings will differ across them. We claim that if ethnic groups are 
evenly spread across the country ethnoregional fragmentation should increase dynamic 
nationalization as voting behavior is more stable when it is driven by identity instead of 
performance. If they are concentrated in specific regions however, dynamic 
nationalization should drop. However, ethnolinguistic fragmentation is not the only social 
feature we can expect to affect the homogeneity of electoral swings. Any politically 
salient feature of the electorate correlated with partisan political sentiment and variable 
across districts –such demographics as employment, average wage or elderly population− 
would increase local variation in response to national forces.  
 
- Economic voting explanation 
Electoral change increases with economic decline. According to the 'grievance 
asymmetry' (Nannestad and Paldam, 1994), voters tend to punish economic performance 
more than they reward good economic performance. The evidence from Denmark, for 
instance, shows that the reaction is about three times larger to a deterioration in the 
economy than to an improvement (Nannestad and Paldam, 1997). If the likelihood of 
common movement across districts decreases with the size of the national swing (see 
8 International Center for Public Policy 
 




The goal of our empirical analysis is twofold. First, with a view to identifying the 
relationship between institutions, cleavages and economic performance and dynamic 
nationalization, we use aggregated data from 31 OECD countries in two consecutive 
lower-house elections before and after 2008, when the Great Recession started. Second, 
we use individual data from national elections in two highly decentralized countries, 
Canada and Spain, to examine the causal mechanism through which decentralization 
affects dynamic nationalization.   
 
Aggregate-level analysis 
 The effect of decentralization on the uniformity of electoral swings is examined 
through regression analyses of the results in 3,796 districts in 62 lower house elections in 
31 OCDE countries. Israel and The Netherlands are not included since they use a single 
national district. Similarly, Switzerland is excluded as representatives from the four main 
parties (i.e., 80 percent of the votes) were members of the Federal Council, which means 
that the distinction between government and opposition is blurred. We focus on the last 
election held before or in 2008, when the Great Recession started, and the first election 
held after 2008.3 See the Appendix for a description of the countries and elections 
included in the sample.4 
 
Our analysis is conducted both at the district and national level using different 
measures of dynamic nationalization. First, we examine the impact of decentralization on 
the deviation of districts from the overall pattern of change in support for the national 
incumbent party. The dependent variable is the absolute difference between (i) the change 
in the national vote share of the national incumbent party between the two elections held 
                                                          
3 In Belgium, the pair of selected elections is 2010 and 2014 instead of the June 2007 – June 2010 cycle for 
two reasons: the instability of government coalitions and the fact that the main opposition party in the 2010 
election, the Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Open VLD), was the second largest party in the 
government until April 2010. In Italy we have selected the April 2006 and the April 2008 election instead 
of the 2008 and 2013 as the incumbent from 2011 to 2013 was a government of technocrats led by Mario 
Monti. 
4 In countries using mixed-member electoral systems, we focus on single-member districts. In France, we 
use the election results for the first round. 
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before and after 2008 and (ii) the change in the district vote share of the national 
incumbent party between the same two elections. If the difference is 0, the national and 
district swings are equal. This means that the party system is perfectly nationalized in 
dynamic terms. The greater the difference, the more different the national and district 
swings, and the lower the degree of dynamic nationalization. The formula is as follows: 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝐴𝑏𝑠((𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 − 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡+1)
− (𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 − 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡+1))  
 
The country average district deviation in our sample is displayed in Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1: 





Second, we explore the relationship between dynamic nationalization and 
decentralization at the national level. Measurement of the dynamic nationalization of 
parties and party systems has been extensively debated, and there is little consensus on 
how to measure it or evaluate its implications (Morgenstern et al., 2014). The most recent 
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(and sophisticated) measures are based on compositional data analysis and the 
components-of-variance model have been proposed (Morgenstern et al., 2014: 190-191). 
The former decomposes the distribution of predicted vote shares into a systematic and a 
random component. It uses random draws from parameter estimates to generate a 
distribution of predicted vote shares for each party across elections, conditional on the 
district-level outcome in the previous election. The slope coefficient captures the extent 
to which partisan support persists between elections, while the national swing is the 
difference between the expected vote share in the current election and the actual prior 
mean (Alemán and Kellam, 2008; 2017). The components-of-variance model 
(Morgenstern and Potthoff, 2005; Morgenstern et al., 2009; Mustillo and Jung, 2016) 
decomposes a party's district-level vote share from two or more elections into variance 
between elections and variation between districts. The latter indicates variation between 
districts in the first election only and is measured as variance in district-level random 
intercepts. The remaining, or residual, variance from the cross-sectional time-series 
analysis or multilevel models is the measure of dynamic nationalization. Despite their 
conceptual and methodological differences, the results they produce are fairly similar 
(Alemán and Kellam, 2017). 
 
 Although valuable, a major weakness of these two techniques when doing cross-
national analyses is the high data requirements. To estimate precise parameters to use 
random draws to generate a distribution of predicted vote shares for parties, on the one 
hand, and fit a national mean trajectory of electoral support, on the other, a high number 
of districts (or any subnational unit) and/or elections is crucial. In most countries using 
Proportional Representation (PR), the number of districts is low. Not surprisingly, most 
of the analyses of dynamic nationalization are focused on countries using first-past-the-
post system. When the analysis is expanded over time and more elections are included, 
the problem is that the boundaries of the districts change, especially when using single-
member districts, and the number of parties entering the race is not constant. As support 
for new parties across districts is more heterogeneous than that of established parties 
(Jones and Mainwaring, 2003; Lago and Lago-Peñas 2016), the interpretation of electoral 
swings in the district vote is not straightforward. 
 
In our aggregate analysis, only two elections are considered and most of the 
countries using PR (11 out of 19) have less than 25 districts. This means that techniques 
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based on compositional data analysis using random draws from parameter estimates and 
the components-of-variance model relying on cross-sectional time-series analysis or 
multilevel models are not very helpful. As is well known, when the time span of the 
sample is short (two elections in our analysis), time-series cross-section are not 
appropriate as the the temporal dimension must be large enough for averaging over time 
to make sense. For instance, Beck (2001: 274) does not recommend using TSCS methods 
when the time span is lower than 10, while for Beck and Katz (2011: 332) the minimum 
should be 15.  
 
 We have chosen a simple measure of dynamic nationalization: the Pearson 
correlation of the district vote across the two elections (Converse, 1969). The higher 
(lower) the correlation, the more (less) nationalized the party system is. The correlation 
captures how support for the incumbent party in every country changes in each district 
between the last lower house election before the Great recession (2008) and the first one 
after 2008.5 The election results are aggregated at the district level instead of the state or 
regional level for two reasons. On the one hand, it is in individual districts that parties 
and candidates decide whether or not to enter the electoral fray and how they distribute 
their resources, and voters make up their mind about how to vote (Cox, 1997). On the 
other, districts are easily comparable across countries, while the relevance and meaning 
of regions or states dramatically differ in a comparative perspective. Those districts whose 
boundaries change between the two elections or new districts in the second election are 
excluded. Similarly, uncontested districts by the incumbent party in one or the two 
elections are also excluded. In all electoral systems, we focus on districts in the lowest 
electoral tier. Finally, in those countries where there is a government coalition in t, the 
results of all parties in the coalition in t and t+1 are aggregated.6 The Pearson correlations 
of the district vote across the two elections before and after the economic crisis in our 
sample of countries are shown in Figure 2. 
 
                                                          
5 When using the Pearson correlation coefficient, the assumption of normality is violated in some countries 
in our sample. For instance, in Luxembourg, Iceland or Slovenia the number of districts (i.e., observations) 
is 4, 6 and 8, respectively. We have run our models using the Kendall’s tau-a correlation coefficient, a 
nonparametric alternative to the Pearson correlation coefficient. The results are very similar. This is not 
surprising, as the correlation between the two measures is 0.97. 
6 When comparing the Pearson correlation coefficient with the few available indicators of nationalization 
using a different method, the results are remarkably similar for the countries included in both samples (see 
Morgenstern et al., 2009).  
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 The Kendall’s tau-a correlation coefficient between our measures of dynamic 
nationalization at the district-level (the average district deviation) and at the national-level 
(the Pearson correlation coefficient) in the sample of 31 countries is 0.53, statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
Figure 2:  
Dynamic nationalization at the national level using the Pearson correlation of the district vote 
 
 
 Our independent variables (they are the same in the two levels of analysis) have 
been operationalized as follows: 
  
- Institutional variables: The key independent variable is the degree of decentralization 
in 2010. It is measured in four different ways to show the robustness of our results. First, 
the authority exercised by a regional government over those who live in the region, self-
rule; second, the authority exercised by a regional government or its representatives in 
the country as a whole, shared-rule, third, the Regional authority index, RAI, which is the 
sum of self-rule and shared-rule; the source is Hooghe et al. (2016)7; finally, we 
                                                          
7 The Regional Authority Index is a measure of the authority of regional governments across ten 
dimensions: institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy, borrowing autonomy, representation, law 
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operationalize the variable using a dummy variable coded 1 if the country is federal; 0, 
otherwise. There are seven federal countries in the sample (Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Germany, Mexico and US). The categorical variable regime captures whether 
the country is presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary. The source is Cheibub et 
al. (2010). The electoral system employed is measured with the (log of) the number of 
districts in the lowest electoral tier based on our own calculations.8 Luxembourg and UK 
are the two extremes.  
 
- Sociological variables: The most commonly used measure of social heterogeneity is 
Fragmentation, defined as the probability that two individuals selected at random from a 
country will be from different ethnic, linguistic or religious groups. The formula is as 
follows:  𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑔 = 1 −  ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗2
𝑁
𝑖=1  where sij is the proportion of group i (i= 1… N) in 
country j. The higher the value of F the higher fragmentation will be. We have included 
the mean of ethnic and linguistic fragmentation in the models. The source is Alesina et 
al. (2003). The variable goes from 0 in South Korea to 0.64 in Canada.9 
 
- Economic variables: The size of economic crisis is captured with ∆GDP, the difference 
in the GDP per capita (US $, constant prices, constant PPPs, reference year 2010) between 
the second and the first election years in every country. The source is the OECD. 10 The 
variable goes from -10.52 in Ireland in to +15.44 in Slovakia. Additionally, we include a 
dummy variable for Eurozone countries in order to capture a similar impact of the 
economic crisis. 
 
The descriptive statistics of all variables at the district and national levels are 
displayed in Table 1. 
                                                          
making, executive control, fiscal control, borrowing control, and constitutional reform. These ten 
dimensions constitute two domains of authority: self-rule, or the authority a regional government exerts 
within its territory; and shared rule, or the authority a regional government or its representatives exerts in 
the country as a whole. Country scores aggregate scores for each regional tier and individual regional 
governments in a country.  
8 We tested for other specifications of the electoral system variable (for instance, a categorical variable 
capturing whether electoral system used in the election was Majoritarian, PR, or Mixed) and the results are 
remarkably similar. 
9 The results do not change appreciably when fragmentation is replaced with segregation (Alesina and 
Zhuravskaya, 2011). We have decided to use the former measure because it is available for all countries in 
our sample. 
10 We tested for other specifications of the economic crisis, in particular the difference in the unemployment 
rate between the two election years in every count. The source is the OECD. The results do not change 
appreciably. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 District-level National-level 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
District-level deviation 3,796 5.17 5.56 0 59.25 - - - - - 
Correlation - - - - - 31 0.79 0.26 -0.19 0.99 
RAI 3,796 18.83 9.15 0 36.99 31 13.79 10.79 0 36.99 
Self-rule 3,796 15.29 5.82 0 24.99 31 11.22 7.41 0 24.99 
Shared-rule 3,796 3.62 4.14 0 12.63 31 2.57 4.19 0 12.63 
Federalism 3,796 0.39 0.49 0 1 31 0.23 0.43 0 1 
Regime 3,796 1.69 0.86 1 3 31 1.52 0.72 1 3 
∆GDP 3,796 0.22 5.13 -10.52 15.44 31 0.02 6.61 -10.52 15.44 
Fragmentation 3,796 0.20 0.18 0 0.64 31 0.21 0.18 0 0.64 
(log) # Districts 3,796 5.52 0.94 1.39 6.47 31 3.93 1.41 1.39 6.47 




The empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. The first step showing that the 
national swing is lower in decentralized countries, and the second step examining the 
extent to which the uniformity of electoral swings in the district vote within countries is 
affected by the degree of decentralization of political and economic power. 
 
 In our sample of 31 OECD countries, the average (absolute) national swing for 
incumbent parties is smaller in the seven federal countries (4.70) than in the 24 unitary 
countries (9.39). The four measures of decentralization we employ in the analyses are 
negatively correlated with the size of the national swing for incumbent parties. In Table 
2 we test whether the national electoral swing (in absolute values) is greater in federal 
countries than in unitary countries. We control for the electoral system following Rowe 
(2015) (the more viable parties there are, the stronger the economic vote) and the 
difference in the GDP per capita between the pre and post-crisis elections (electoral 
change increases with economic decline). As can be seen, the swing is almost 5 points 
lower in federal countries than in unitary ones and the variable is statistically significant 
at the 0.05 percent level. 




Table 2: The determinants of electoral swings  
 Model 
Dep. Variable: National electoral swing 1 
Federalism -4.859** 
(2.279) 











Estimation is by OLS. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
**p<0.05; ***p<0.01 (two-tailed).         
 
When explaining the determinants of dynamic nationalization, we show first the 
results of the district-level analysis (Table 3). All standard errors are clustered by country 
to account for the non-independence in the data structure. As expected, the four variables 
capturing the degree of decentralization of power are negatively correlated with district-
level deviation from the overall pattern of change in support for the national incumbent 
party. In other words, decentralization increases dynamic nationalization. Interestingly, 
the authority exercised by a regional government in the country (third model) and 
federalism (fourth model) are statistically significant (at the 0.01 percent levels, while the 
Regional Authority Index (first model) and the authority exercised by a regional 
government over those who live in the region (model 2) are not. These results strongly 
support our argument that the effect of decentralization on dynamic nationalization is 
driven by the influence of regional incumbent over the central government. Finally, the 
only statistically relevant controls are the dummy for presidential regimes and the number 
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of districts. Both variables increase district-level variation in the incumbent party's 










Table 3: The determinants of district-level dynamic nationalization in hard times  
 Models 
Dep. Variable: District-level deviation 1 2 3 4 
RAI -0.044 
(0.033) 
   
Self-rule  -0.019 
(0.063) 
  
Shared-rule   -0.139*** 
(0.049) 
 
Federalism    -1.302*** 
(0.445) 




























































N 3,796 3,796 3,796 3,796 
# of clusters 31 31 31 31 
R2 0.085 0.084 0.088 0.088 
Estimation is by OLS. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 (two-tailed).         
 
 
 The results of our national-level estimates are displayed in Table 4. There is a 
clear outlier, Slovenia, which has been dropped.11 The four variables capturing the degree 
of decentralization of power have again the expected (positive) effect in the models. The 
main finding is that, irrespective of how the variable is measured, decentralization 
increases dynamic nationalization. In the first model, the authority of regional 
governments, RAI, is statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level. The second and third 
models show that the effect of decentralization on dynamic nationalization is driven by 
the influence of regions over the central government policymaking. While Self-rule is not 
statistically significant, Shared-rule is statistically significant at the 0.05 percent level. 
When using the dummy variable identifying federal countries in the fourth model, the 
variable is statistically significant at the 0.05 percent level. Apart from decentralization, 
the only statistically significant variable (at the 0.1 percent level) is the dummy for 
presidential regimes.  
 
 Finally, in models 5 and 6 we explicitly test the mechanism behind the impact of 
decentralization, namely that the national swing and then its district variation is lower in 
decentralized countries. If this is true, when adding the (absolute) national swing, the 
degree of decentralization should not significantly affect dynamic nationalization. This is 
exactly what we observe when running again our two models with the highest fit (models 
3 and 4) with this additional control. When adding the national swing to the models, the 
coefficients on Shared-rule and Federalism are reduced to statistically insignificant 
values, while the National swing negatively affects dynamic nationalization, In other 
                                                          
11 Whereas the Pearson correlation coefficient for Slovenia is -0.19, the average for the remaining thirty 
countries is 0.82 (the standard deviation is 0.18). When running the model with RAI, for instance, the 
Studentized residual for Slovenia is -4.71 while all the residuals for the remaining observations do not 
exceed ±1.79.  
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words, the greater the national electoral change, the less uniform the electoral swings in 
the district vote. 
 
Table 4: The determinants of dynamic nationalization at the national level in hard times  
 Models 
Dep. variable: Correlation 1 2 3 4 5 6 
RAI 0.006* 
(0.003) 
     
Self-rule  0.008 
(0.006) 
    


































































































N 30 30 30 30 30 30 
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R2 0.334 0.296 0.328 0.335 0.570 0.547 
Estimation is by OLS. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*p<0.10; ***p<0.01 (two-tailed) 
Individual-level analysis 
 In the individual-level analysis, we examine the mechanism that may account for 
the positive effect of decentralization on dynamic nationalization in the context of an 
economic recession, namely that multilevel governance mutes the effects of national 
economic conditions on incumbent voting by undermining responsibility linkages to the 
national government. We focus on the 2011 lower house election in Catalonia and Madrid 
(Spain) and the 2015 federal election in British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec (Canada) 
for three reasons. First, in the two elections the incumbent is accountable for a poor 
economic performance. In Canada, the annual growth rate in 2015 was 0.9% (2.6% in 
2014), the lowest since 2010, while in Spain the annual growth rate in 2011 was -1.0% 
(0.0% in 2010), in both cases according to the OECD. Similarly, in the five regions the 
regional incumbent is different than the national one. 
 
 Second, the two countries are highly decentralized. According to the Regional 
Authority Index elaborated by Hooghe et al. (2016), in a sample of 81 countries, in 2010 
Spain was the second most decentralized in the world (Germany was the first) and Canada 
was the eighth. Spain was the country where subnational influence over the central 
government's actions (the shared-rule dimension) is strongest and Canada was the twelfth, 
while Spain ranked sixth and Canada eighth on the self-rule dimension.  
  
 Finally, for the two elections an Internet panel survey with the same technical 
characteristics was conducted by the Making Electoral Democracy Work project. The 
questionnaire is particularly well suited for our purposes. Apart from the conventional 
questions about voting behavior in the previous and current elections and conventional 
determinants of voting, there are specific questions tapping respondents' perceptions of 
the influence of the national and regional government on their well-being and satisfaction 
with the performance of the national government over the last 12 months. Additionally, 
as vote choice is captured after the election but economic evaluations and attribution of 
responsibilities are tapped before the election, the endogeneity of partisanship with 
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respect to economic evaluation is a less serious concern in comparison with cross-
sectional survey data. An independent survey was conducted in every region.12  
 In Figure 3 we show which government, the national or the regional, is the most 
important for individuals in the five regions.13 We have created a variable, Responsibility, 
capturing the difference between the influence of the policies of the regional and national 
governments on a scale going from 0 (very small impact) to 10 (very big impact) 
according to the respondent. Positive values mean that the policies of the regional 
government are more influential than those of the national government, while negative 
values mean exactly the inverse. When the difference is 0, the perceived influence of the 
policies of the regional and national governments is the same. As can be seen, in the five 
regions most of the respondents believe that the policies of the national and regional 
governments have a similar influence on their well-being. Interestingly, both in Quebec 
and Catalonia, where the regional cleavage is stronger, the regional government is seen 
as more influential than the national one, while in British Columbia, Ontario and Madrid 











                                                          
12 The Canadian federal election was held on October 19, 2015. The pre-election survey was conducted 
between October 9-18, 2015, and the post-election survey between October 20 and November 5, 2015 in 
Ontario and between October 20 and November 6, 2015 in British Columbia and Quebec. The 
representative samples include 1,959 respondents in British Columbia, 1,974 in Ontario and 1,920 in 
Quebec in the pre-election survey, and 1,426 respondents in British Columbia, 1,545 in Ontario and 1,381 
in Quebec in the post-election survey. The national election in Spain was held on November 20, 2011. The 
pre-election survey was conducted between November 10-19, 2011, and the post-election survey between 
November 21 and December 4, 2011. The representative samples include 1,047 respondents in Madrid and 
1,014 in Catalonia in the pre-election survey, and 899 respondents in Madrid ad 886 in Catalonia in the 
postelection survey. All these surveys were conducted by Harris International/Nielsen, relying on their 
panel of respondents. The sampling was based on a stratified, quota-based approach. Quotas were set for 
age, gender, education and region. For further details see www.electoraldemocracy.com 
13 The specific questions in the survey are the following: “How much influence do the policies of the 
following governments have on the well-being of you and your family: National government?” and “How 
much influence do the policies of the following governments have on the well-being of you and your family: 
Regional government?” 
 












 A more sophisticated analysis with data again for Canada and Spain to test the 
argument is conducted in Table 5. We argue that subnational variation in electoral swings 
is reduced in decentralized countries as national incumbents are less accountable for poor 
economic outcomes than in centralized countries. At the individual level, most of the 
swing that occurs between the election that precedes the recession and the following 
election pertains to voters who supported the party that formed the government after the 
first election and who punished that party in the second election. Our hypothesis is simply 
that those who are dissatisfied with the performance of the national government will be 
more reluctant to switch their vote (and support another party) in the upcoming national 
election if they think that regional policies are more influential than national ones. In other 
words, blaming the regional government for a bad national performance reduces the 
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In line with the aggregated empirical analysis, the dependent variable is a 
categorical variable coded 0 if the respondent voted for the national incumbent in the two 
consecutive elections, the Conservative Party in Canada and the Socialist Party in Spain; 
1 if the respondent voted for the national incumbent in the current election but for another 
party in the previous election; and 2 if the respondent voted for an opposition party in the 
current election, but for the national incumbent in the previous election. In other words, 
we have three groups of voters: voters who are loyal to the incumbent (58 percent of the 
sample), swing voters who support the national incumbent in the current election (the 10 
percent of the sample), and swing voters who support an opposition party in the current 
election (the 32 percent of the sample). Given that the dependent variable is categorical, 
multinomial logistic regressions have been run. The reference category is voters who are 
loyal to the incumbent (value 0).  
 
The key independent variable, Responsibility, is the difference between the 
perceived influence of the policies of the regional and national governments using a scale 
going from 0 (very small impact) to 10 (very big impact). The variable ranges from -10 
to 10. Positive values mean that the policies of the regional government are perceived to 
be more influential than those of the national government, while negative values mean 
exactly the inverse. When the difference is 0, the perceived influence of the policies of 
the regional and national governments is the same. We control for three variables: 
satisfaction with the performance of the national government over the last 12 months, 
coded 1 if for those who are not satisfied and 0 for those who are satisfied; attachment to 
the region on a scale ranging from 0 (not attached at all) to 10 (very strongly attached); 





















Table 5: The determinants of voting for the incumbent in Canada and Spain  
  
 
Swing voter supporting an 
opposition party vs  
loyal to the incumbent 
Swing voter supporting the 
incumbent vs 
loyal to the incumbent 


































# of clusters 5 
Pseudo R2 0.133 
  Note: Estimation is by Maximum-likelihood. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
  **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 (two-tailed). 
 
 
The results indicate that Responsibility has a negative (and statistically significant 
at the 0.01 percent level) impact on switching to opposition parties and no effect on 
switching to government. The less influential the policies of the regional government are 
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for the respondents' well-being, the lower the probability of being loyal to the national 
incumbent. The effect of the importance of national and regional policies on the 
probability of voting for the incumbent in Canada and Spain when all the remaining 
independent variables are set at their mean values is shown in Figure 4. As can be seen, 
the more influential the policies of the regional government are, the greater the probability 





Figure 4: The effect of the perceived of national and regional policies  





                                                          
14 When running the model separately for those who are not satisfied with the performance of the national 
incumbent, on the one hand, and those who are satisfied with it, on the other, the variable Responsibility is 
only statistically significant for the former (at the 0.05 percent level when the dependent variable is Swing 
voter supporting the incumbent vs swing voter supporting an opposition party and at the 0.01 percent level 
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The institutional, sociological and economic variables explored in this study shed 
light on patterns of subnational variation in electoral swings. Using district-level data 
from OECD countries and individual-level data for national elections in Canada and 
Spain, we have shown that, contrary to what we may intuitively believe, decentralization 
leads to higher, not lower, dynamic nationalization. The electoral swing away from the 
incumbent government that we observe at the time of the recession is in fact more, not 
less, homogeneous in more decentralized countries. This counterintuitive finding is due 
to the fact that the overall national swing away from the incumbent is reduced when the 
country is decentralized, since the incumbent government is less likely to be deemed 
responsible for the recession. Because the national swing against the incumbent 
government is weaker variations around that swing are therefore weaker, with the result 
that the swing is more homogeneous. 
 
More specifically, we have presented an original argument accounting for the 
counterintuitive positive effect of decentralization on dynamic nationalization, at least 
when there is a recession. The greater the degree of political and economic 
decentralization, the more influential regional policies are for individuals’ well-being. In 
the context of the Great recession, this means that supporters of the national incumbent 
party in the previous election who primarily blame the regional incumbent for worsening 
economic conditions will be less reluctant to switch their vote (and support an opposition 
party) in the upcoming national election. As this decision-making process applies to 
individuals in all districts in decentralized countries, the number of swing voters is 
systematically lower and electoral swings are more uniform when regions are influential 
over the central government. 
  
Finally, the assumption of our argument about the positive effect of 
decentralization on dynamic nationalization is that voters hold the incumbent accountable 
for its past economic performance. A vast literature on retrospective economic voting 
shows that it is the case in most elections. A relevant research question that our paper 
opens up is the extent to which decentralization plays the same role when the vote is 
prospective or position issues are dominant in an election. 
 
 APPENDIX: Sample of countries and elections 
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 Australia, 2007 and 2010; Austria, 2008 and 2013; Belgium, 2010 and 2014; Canada, 
2008 and 2011; Chile, 2005 and 2009; Czech Republic, 2006 and 2010; Demark, 2007 
and 2011; Estonia, 2007 and 2011; Finland, 2007 and 2011; France, 2007 and 2012; 
Germany, 2005 and 2009; Greece, 2007 and 2009; Hungary, 2006 and 2010; Iceland, 
2007 and 2009; Ireland, 2007 and 2011; Italy, 2006 and 2008; Japan, 2005 and 2009; 
Luxembourg, 2004 and 2009; Mexico, 2006 and 2009; New Zealand, 2008 and 2011; 
Norway, 2005 and 2009; Poland, 2007 and 2011; Portugal, 2005 and 2009; Slovakia, 
2006 and 2010; Slovenia, 2008 and 2011; South Korea, 2008 and 2012; Spain, 2008 and 
2011; Sweden, 2006 and 2010; Turkey, 2007 and 2011; UK, 2005 and 2010; and US, 
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